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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 60 FEBRUARY 1962 No. 4 
THE ANTIDUMPING ACT: ITS ADMINISTRATION AND 
PLACE IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 
James A. Kohn* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
P ROBABLY the most important development in the laws regulat-ing the importation of foreign goods in recent years has been 
the increase in the delegation of functions by Congress to the 
executive. Despite the number of comprehensive tariff bills during 
the first three decades of the century, more flexible methods were 
necessary to deal with the multifarious problems created by in-
creased imports. Merely raising or lowering the specific and ad 
valorem rates became too crude a device. The response to the 
necessity for more subtle adjustments was for Congress to set poli-
cies and leave the details to the administrators. 
Congress has delegated several types of adjusting mechanisms 
to supplement the basic tariff laws.1 At one extreme is the so-
called scientific flexible tariff provision, designed to equalize the 
cost of production of foreign goods with that of American goods 
by the imposition of a duty. Despite its description as "scientific," 
it is really protectionism. At the other extreme is the authoriza-
tion given the President by the Trade Agreements Act2 to nego-
tiate tariff modifications with other countries, any modification 
then being generalized to extend the reduced rate to imports from 
still other countries. In spite of the inclusion of an escape clause, 3 
• Member of the California Bar.-Ed. 
1 There has always been some authority delegated to the executive by the Congress. 
See LARKIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF nm TARIFF 37-61 (1936) for prior history of 
such delegation. What is unique in the twentieth century is the degree of reliance on 
the executive. The cumulative effect of the actions taken by administrative officials has 
been termed the "invisible tariff." BIDWELL, THE INVISIBLE TARIFF (1939) • 
2 48 Stat. 943 (1934), as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-64 (1958). 
8 Act of June 16, 1951, § 6, 65 Stat. 73, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1363 (1958). The 
escape clause provides that any reduction in duty proclaimed under the Trade Agree-
ments Act shall not be permitted to continue when any product subject to the reduced 
duty is imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to cause or 
threaten serious injury to domestic industry producing like or competitive products. 
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this statute is a significant step toward liberalization of trade. Some-
where between these polar positions are a number of statutory 
devices whose stated goal is to prevent "unfair" practices by foreign 
producers, exporters and governments which are harmful to the 
American domestic economy. Examples are the countervailing 
duty, imposed to neutralize export bounties; the exclusion of 
goods produced or sold by "unfair methods of competition or un-
fair acts" which has been applied to merchandise produced by 
unlicensed foreign producers of patented American processes; and 
the Antidumping Act.4 True, the impetus for these acts has come 
from protectionists and their impact has been to reduce imports 
in some commodities. But unlike the flexible tariff or the high 
rates of the Smoot~Hawley Tariff of 1930, these devices are aimed 
only at the preservation of what Congress deems to be "fair" 
competition. 
Broadly, the Antidumping Act prevents the "dumping" of 
foreign goods in the United States by imposing a duty equal to 
the excess of the price in foreign markets over the price in the 
United States when such price discrimination injures an American 
industry. For example, if a Japanese manufacturer sells at 30 in 
Japan and at 25 to an American importer, the importer must pay 
a dumping duty of 5. But if he sells to the importer at 30 while 
the prevailing American market price is, say, 40, he has not 
"dumped" the goods. The reasons for this latter conclusion lie in 
notions of fairness and in economics of comparative advantage, 
i.e., an advantageous international division of labor. 
It has now been forty years since the present Antidumping Act 
was passed. During that period certain administrative interpreta-
tions and procedures have developed. This discussion will not 
attempt a general exposition of the act,5 but rather will examine 
key terms which are not defined by the act itself, the administra-
tive decisions interpreting these terms, and the soundness of these 
decisions when tested against the purposes of the act. In analyzing 
4 Flexible tariff, 46 Stat. 701 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1336 (1958); Trade 
Agreements Act, 48 Stat. 943 (1934), as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-64 (1958); counter-
vailing duty, 46 Stat. 687 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1!103 (1958); unfair competition, 46 Stat. 
703 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958); Antidumping Act of 1921, amended 
by 68 Stat. 1138 (1954), as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-73 (1958). Hereinafter the Anti-
dumping Act will be referred to in the text simply as "the act." 
5 A good explication of the act may be found in Ehrenhaft, Protection Against Inter-
11ational Price Discrimination: United States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 
58 COLUM. L. REv. 44 (1958) • 
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these decisions, not only the factors that influenced the original 
passage of the act must be considered, but also the events which 
have occurred since the passage of the act in 1921, such as our ex-
panded foreign trade, the altered aims of our foreign policy, 
changes in congressional economic thinking as manifested by such 
laws as the Robinson-Patman Act, and the strength of our domestic 
industry in terms of its ability to compete against foreign compe-
tition. This article will also explore, in the light of these factors, 
areas in which the act may need revision. 
II. PASSAGE OF THE ANTIDUMPING AcT 
The Economic Background 
In order to analyze legislation designed to prevent dumping, it 
is necessary first to look briefly at the causes and types of dumping. 
Economists are agreed that dumping should be defined as "price-
discrimination between national markets." This definition was ad-
vanced by Professor Viner in 19236 and has been used as a starting 
point since then. But it is clear that not every case of what Viner 
calls dumping is undesirable. For example, a German producer 
selling chemicals at a higher price in the United States than in 
Germany is "discriminating between national markets," in Viner's 
terms, but this so-called reverse dumping calls for no preventative 
measures by the United States. Taking this into account, Viner 
restricts the definition to include only that dumping which is 
potentially injurious: "sales for export at lower prices than those 
charged at the same time and under like circumstances to buyers 
for the domestic market. " 7 
Within the definition of dumping, there is a customary cate-
gorization drawn in terms of the intent of the foreign producer. 
The categories, broadly, are sporadic, intermittent and continu-
ous. 8 Sporadic dumping is typically a single transaction phenome-
non. The foreign producer may find himself left with an overstock 
at the end of the season. Rather than disturb the price structure in 
6 VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1923) [hereinafter cited 
as VINER]. This is the standard text on the subject. For a discussion of Viner's defini-
tion as compared to a definition based on sales below cost of production, see VON 
HABERLER, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 296-300 (1936) • 
7 VINER, MEMORANDUM ON DUMPING 3 (League of Nations Pub. No. 1926.II.63) • 
s VINER 23-33. The outlines of the discussion of the classification of dumping are 
drawn from Viner's text. 
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the primary market of his own country, he may choose to dispose 
of the goods quickly, at a dumping price, in another country. 
Intermittent dumping is described as typically part of a broader 
scheme by a foreign producer to establish or maintain a market 
for his goods abroad. He may sell at a dumping price to gain entry 
to the market, or to compensate for a natural preference of con-
sumers for goods made at home, or to protect against competition 
by domestic producers trying to gain a portion of a market that he 
already controls. The foreign producer underselling his competi-
tors to establish a monopoly by driving them out of business also 
falls into this class. Intermittent dumping, as contrasted with 
sporadic dumping, is directed toward the attainment of a per-
manent share of a market. 
On the other hand, continuous dumping finds its rationale in 
the· producer's economic relationship to his own country. An 
example is the manufacturer who maintains full production be-
cause of the consequent reduction in marginal cost of each unit 
produced, even though he is able to sell his entire output only by 
exporting a portion of it at a dumping price which brings in little 
if any profit. Because the impact of such dumping on the foreign 
market is not viewed by the producer as a reason for later adjust-
ment of his price, this type of dumping will continue over a 
prospectively permanent period. 
The fundamental economic question for each of the three cate-
gories is whether the advantage to the consumer who is able to 
purchase cheap goods outweighs the injury to producers who must 
try to compete with such goods. When dumping is sporadic, it is 
relatively unimportant to either the consumer or the domestic 
producer, although the gain to the consumer probably outweighs 
the injury to the producers. Continuous dumping, also, is thought 
not to be detrimental to the importing country since the consumer 
will enjoy a relatively permanent reduced price, and it will then 
be economically advantageous for the capital and labor of the 
domestic industry to move to the production of other goods. The 
chief danger, economists agree, is in intermittent dumping. It 
demoralizes and may irreparably injure domestic industry without 
the corresponding advantage to the consumer of permanently 
lowered prices. Once the objective is gained, whether it is entry 
to the market or destruction of domestic producers, prices are 
raised and the consumer suffers in the long run. 
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The discussion thus far has been relatively abstract. At this 
point the relevant question is, how may one type of dumping be 
distinguished from another at the time the dumping occurs? With-
out a thorough investigation of a foreign firm's economic position 
vis-a-vis its country's economy, the foreign industry and the do-
mestic industry of the importing country, it would be impossible 
to decide whether an isolated case of dumping was sporadic, in-
termittent or continuous. And such a decision would be compli-
cated by the fact that one must project the motive of the foreign 
producer into the future. Moreover, making a determination on 
the date of a producer's first instance of dumping assumes that in 
all cases he will have the same, single motive; this assumption 
seems unrealistic. Thus, it would be impractical to try to frame a 
statute directed in terms against intermittent dumping only. 
The obvious alternative would be to prohibit all dumping. 
Viner suggests this approach and supports it by saying that "dump-
ing prices are presumptive evidence of abnormal and temporary 
cheapness"9 and therefore injurious to domestic industry without 
being permanently helpful to consumers. This proposal has the 
merit of ease of administration, since it simply matches the home 
consumption price of the foreign producer with his export price 
and leaves the question of motive to the economic analysts. 
There is at least one instance, however, in which this proposal 
is inadequate. This is the situation in which the foreign producer 
sells for a price below his price for home consumption in order to 
meet the price of his competitors in the importing country. Unless 
he can reduce his price to a competitive level he cannot hope to 
compete with the producers in the importing country. Even if the 
assumption that the dumping will be intermittent is justified in 
this case, the corresponding assumption that such dumping is 
harmful is no longer true since the domestic producer is not being 
undersold. Thus Viner's approach should be amended, if it is to 
serve as the basis for effective legislation, to prohibit dumping 
except when its purpose is to do no more than meet domestic 
competition. We may call this approach the "competitive-price" 
theory. 
9 VINER 147. Von Haberler agrees with this analysis and says that it makes no difference 
to the importing country whether goods come in cheaply because of dumping, export 
bounties or comparative advantage; dumping is undesirable because its artificiality means 
that cheapness caused by it will not last as long as that caused by comparative advantage. 
VON HABERLER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 314. 
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Viner mentions this situation, but does not draw any distinc-
tion between it and other cases of dumping, for he says that com-
petition from the foreign producer "will tend to force down the 
prices [ of the producer in the importing country] and to necessitate 
a still further reduction of his own prices."10 But this argument 
assumes that domestic producers can sell their goods only if they 
price them below goods of foreign producers, or it assumes that 
there is some policy which protects domestic businessmen against 
competition from other producers who are only meeting, not un-
dercutting, the domestic market price. Neither of these assump-
tions seems warranted. When a domestic and a foreign producer 
compete at the same price, it is more likely that the sales of the 
former will be far larger, not that he will be forced to cut his price 
to overcome foreign competition. This can be seen in cases de-
cided by the Tariff Commission under the escape clause of the 
Trade Agreements Act.11 The Commission says repeatedly that, 
other things being equal, American buyers prefer to buy from 
American manufacturers because the source of supply is closer, 
more reliable and better known.12 The other phase of the argu-
ment, that there is some policy seeking to insulate a domestic 
producer from competitive prices, seems equally unjustified. The 
domestic analogue to the Antidumping Act is the Robinson-Pat-
man Act which prevents price discrimination, except where the 
defense can show that it made sales below its normal price in 
order to meet competition.13 The potential effect on the American 
economy of the domestic chain stores against whom the Robinson-
Patman Act was directed14 is surely greater than that of the foreign 
producers who may dump goods in the United States, and yet that 
law allows price discrimination "for the purpose of meeting," al-
though "not for the purpose of beating or preventing competi-
tion."15 It seems clear that there is no general policy that prevents 
10 VINER 132. 
11 65 Stat. 73 (1951), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1363 (1958) • 
12 E.g., U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, INVESTIGATION No. 13 UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS Acr (1953) (wood screws of iron and steel) . 
13 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, b, 21a (1958). Section I (b) of the 
Robinson Patman Act provides in part: "[Nothing] herein contained shall prevent a 
seller ••. showing that his lower price • . . was made in good faith to meet an equally 
low price of a competitor ...• " 15 U.S.C. § 13 (b) (1958) . 
14 Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty-Year Perspective, 57 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1057 (1957) contains an excellent account of the history of the statute 
and the evils at which it was directed. 
15 AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN 
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price competition; that such competition is to be protected even 
where price discrimination is the result. It is hard to see why a 
domestic producer is entitled to have his competitor's goods ex-
cluded from the market when the competitor is willing to compete 
at the market price, regardless of whether the competitor is do-
mestic or foreign. 
If this "competitive-price" theory is accepted, it raises a further 
question: can the foreign producer reduce his price to compete 
with other foreign producers, as well as to compete with Ameri-
can producers? Suppose an American producer sells at 30 and a 
Japanese producer at a non-dumping price of 25. Can a German 
who sells in Germany at 35 sell in the United States at 25, or only 
at 30? It would seem that the German producer should be able to 
compete with his American competitor, but that an American 
statute should not allow him to dump to meet other foreign 
competition, since the purpose of dumping legislation is to protect 
domestic producers from competition which is unfair as to them-
no more protection than this, but also no less. 
The Historical Context 
The Antidumping Act of 1921 was not Congress' first attempt 
to deal with the problem of international price discrimination. 
In 1916 it was made a crime to dump goods into the United States 
"with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United 
States, ... or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade or 
commerce in such articles in the United States."16 It is clear that 
in 1916 Congress was concerned with eradicating practices of for-
eign producers that correspond to the kind of illegal activities 
which prompted the Sherman Act, i.e., predatory price cutting. 
In the debate over the bill Senator Penrose called attention to 
such predatory dumping by German cartels.17 The penalties, also 
following the pattern of the antitrust laws, included fines up to 
$5,000, imprisonment up to one year and a provision for treble 
damages. This statute has been wholly ineffective: there has never 
Acr 98 (1950) • The inexorable, progressive reduction of prices feared by Viner if foreign 
producers are allowed to dump to meet competition would surely be a more real threat 
in the situation envisaged by the Robinson-Patman Act: chain stores competing with 
comer grocers. Yet Congress allowed the defense of meeting competition. It seems to 
follow that in cases of dumping, meeting competition should be an a fortiori defense. 
16 39 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1958). 
17 53 CONG. REc. 14147-48 (1916). 
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been a prosecution under it. The necessity of showing a predatory 
motive and the difficulty of reaching the foreign producer to im-
pose a penalty make it unworkable. It was the failure of the 1916 
statute that led to the enactment of the Antidumping Act of 
1921.18 
Although the 1921 statute attacks the problem differently, 
there can be little doubt that the congressional conception of the 
evils of dumping had not changed. The sanctions of the antitrust 
laws were dropped because of their unworkability, not because of 
a divorcement of dumping and unfair monopoly practices in the 
congressional mind. A Tariff Commission report on dumping 
made in 1919 at congressional request, and relied on in the formu-
lation of the 1921 statute, reiterated concern over the predatory 
tactics of the German dye industry and found it injurious because 
domestic businesses are forced "to sell their entire output at a 
small margin of profit, or even at a loss."19 The concentration on 
stopping predatory dumping was echoed by the report of the 
House Ways and Means Committee2° and by the debates.21 Like 
the Tariff Commission, and the public which was pressing for ef-
fective legislation, Congress reacted largely in response to the 
publicity given to German dumping.22 In addition, there were 
examples of dumping by American firms which were noted by the 
legislators. It was recognized that these corporations had dumped 
merchandise in such countries as England and Canada in a preda-
tory fashion, and the intent was to prevent the same tactics by 
foreign cartels. 
III. ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE AcT 
The Finding of Sales for Less Than "Fair Value" 
The Antidumping Act of 1921 directs the Secretary of the 
Treasury to make a finding of dumping when a foreign producer 
18 VINER, MEMORANDUM op. cit. supra note 7, at Ill. In this memorandum, written in 
1926, Viner states that he has found no prosecutions in any country that has a penal 
anti-dumping statute. Congressman Fordney, Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, asked the Tariff Commission to study the 1916 statute and the Canadian 
statute. The report was quite critical of the American statute. U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, 
DUMPING AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (1919) • 
19 U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 18, at 20. 
20 H.R. REP. No. 1, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1921) • 
21 61 CONG. REc. 254, 262 (remarks of Congressman Fordney) , 1021 (remarks of 
Senator Mccumber) (1921) • 
22 Even Viner, who thinks dumping by German cartels was over-dramatized, admits 
that it was the target of American reaction against dumping. VINER 51-53. 
1962] THE ANTIDUMPING AcT 415 
injures a domestic industry by selling merchandise in the United 
States "at less than its fair value."23 Thus, the economic policy of 
the act came to rest in but two words in section 201 (a): "fair 
value." Is any sale for less than foreign market value a sale for 
less than "fair value"? Or is the Secretary to exercise discretion? 
The statute itself is not clear. The rejection of the approach of 
the 1916 penal statute made it clear that predatory intent was not 
to be the determinative factor, and yet it was also clear that preda-
tory dumping was still the evil that Congress sought to eliminate. 
The Secretary of the Treasury in 1923 chose a mathematical 
approach: goods were deemed sold for less than fair value if the 
purchase price in this country was below the foreign producer's 
home market price.24 Thus, "fair value" was not given a distinct 
meaning; it was defined solely in terms of the duty to be collected. 
This duty is also computed by comparing the purchase price with 
the home market price. This definition of fair value requires a 
finding of dumping whenever the home market price exceeds the 
purchase price. In effect, this decision adheres to Viner's solution, 
to prohibit all dumping rather than to attempt to distinguish 
permissible from undesirable dumping. Such a definition of fair 
valu~ is open to attack on several counts. First, from a reading of 
the text of the act it is seen that the term "fair value" is used but 
once-in section 201 (a). It is not defined and is not equated with 
the computation of the dumping duty, although the latter could 
easily have been accomplished through explicit language or by 
retaining an earlier House version of the bill. Section 201 (b) 
directs the Secretary to make an investigation whenever he has 
reason to believe that the purchase price or exporter's sale price 
is lower than the foreign market value; but subsection (a) allows 
him to issue a finding of dumping (subject to a finding of injury) 
only if he finds sales for less than fair value. In a carefully drafted 
statute such as this,25 the implication must be that "fair value" 
28 § 201 (a), amended by 68 Stat. 1138 (1954), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1958). 
24 Art. 712. Unfair Value.-Merchandise is sold at less than its fair value within the 
meaning of section 201 (a) of the act if the purchase price or exporter's sale price of 
such merchandise is less than its foreign market value (or cost of production) • 1923 Cust. 
Reg. 370. This form was preserved until 1955. 
25 In 1923 Viner said the act was "in almost all respects a model of draftsmanship." 
VINER 262, Since then he has acknowledged that despite the complexity of the provi-
sions, the statute is subject to abuse by administrative officials. Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report 
Pursuant to Sec. 5 (a) of Public Law 304, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 607 (1955) • 
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was to have a meaning independent of the mathematical method 
of computing the duty. 
Second, the legislative history discussed in part two of this 
article shows that Congress did not demand a showing of intent 
in the Antidumping Act because of the failure of the 1916 penal 
statute which had been directed, in terms, only at intentional 
predatory dumping; but the history does not indicate that intent 
was to be totally irrelevant. And third, the evolution of the bill 
shows that Congress intended the Secretary of the Treasury to use 
discretion. The original House bill did not contain the "fair 
value" provision; it was put in by the Senate.26 When explicitly 
asked the meaning of the term during the debate, Senator Mc-
Cumber, spokesman for the bill, replied that 
"there should be that clear distinction between the foreign 
market value for the purpose of levying your tariff and a fair 
value for determining whether or not an article is being 
dumped into this country for the purpose of destroying an 
industry."27 
The debate indicates that the Secretary was to use discretion in 
determining when goods are sold for less than fair value, and this 
necessarily involves an inquiry into the reasons why the purchase 
price is at its present level, i.e., whether the "value" of the goods 
means they are being sold at a price less than "fair."28 The regula-
tion adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury in 1923 leaves no 
room for discretion-if the purchase price is below the foreign 
market value, the finding of dumping is made (provided a do-
mestic industry is injured). The regulation restores the version 
of the bill that was explicitly rejected by Congress. In 1955 the 
regulations were revised, but the basic approach to the definition 
of "fair value" remains unchanged.29 
The Secretary's regulation makes no concession to a flexible 
approach. It would seem that a definition of fair value which 
corresponded to the competitive-price theory would be preferable. 
Such a regulation would avoid the problem presented by the 1916 
statute, for no assessment of intent is necessary. On the other 
26 S. REP. No. 16, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921) • 
21 61 CoNG. REc. 1103 (1921) (remarks of Senator Mccumber). 
28 The Democrats wanted "fair value" defined by statute, but no amendment to this 
effect was proposed. 
29 19 C.F.R. § 14.7 (1961). 
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hand, the Secretary would not have uncontrolled discretion as to 
how to proceed or what factors are relevant. Moreover, it accords 
with the legislative history and gives the Secretary a more signifi-
cant function than the making of an arithmetic computation. 
Finally, it would be in harmony with the spirit of competition en-
forced in domestic trade by the antitrust and Robinson-Patman 
acts and with our foreign policy of promoting freely competitive 
world trade. There have been cases in which a price which was 
technically a dumping price under the regulation did not even 
reduce the price to the level of the competitive domestic market 
price. The Secretary nonetheless followed the regulation and 
found sales for less than fair value.30 This bizarre result excludes 
goods which had not even achieved a competitive price. In view 
of the congressional emphasis on the promotion of "fairness" by 
the act, this degree of protection to domestic industry seems un-
warranted. 
The Determination of Injury to Domestic Industry 
Prior to 1954 the Secretary of the Treasury made both of the 
determinations required for a finding of dumping: which sales are 
for less than fair value, and whether the result of such sales is that 
"an industry in the United States is being or is likely to be injured, 
or is prevented from being established."31 The latter function was 
transferred to the Tariff Commission in 1954 because of the Com-
mission's experience in findings of injury under the escape clause.32 
As in the case of "fair value," there is no definition of what consti-
tutes an "injury" in the act itself. Neither can one obtain any 
guidance from the legislative history. 
From 1955 through June of 1961 the Tariff Commission proc-
essed sixteen cases and found three cases of injury. From the tenor 
of the reports of these investigations it seems that the Commission 
is applying roughly the same criteria in these cases as in the escape-
clause cases.33 This seems appropriate, since the decision to en-
so 1959 TARIFF COMMISSION MIN, REP. 34-35. 
31 For standards of injury required by other countries, see GATT, ANTI-DUMPING 
AND COUNTERVAILING DUllES 16-17 (1958) [hereinafter cited as GATT, ANTI-DUMPING 
DUTIES]. 
32 The transfer to the Tariff Commission was made by the Customs Simplification Act 
of 1954, § 301, 68 Stat. 1138, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1958). 
83 1955-60 TARIFF COMMISSION ANN. R.EPs. Some of the factors used in deciding 
escape-clause cases are the level of gross sales and profits, the number of people 
employed, the number of firms in the field, and the share of the market. 
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trust this task to the Commission rested on the expertise acquired 
from handling escape-clause proceedings. 
Nevertheless, a potentially dangerous precedent was set in the 
first case in which the Commission found an injury. A producer 
of cast-iron soil pipe in California complained of injury due to 
competition from dumped British soil pipe. He claimed that the 
industry injured by the import competition was the California 
segment of the total American industry. California produced eight 
percent of domestic soil pipe. Imports equalled three percent 
of California production and four-tenths percent of total domestic 
production. Production and profits had been increasing in the 
nation as a whole, as well as in California. Surprisingly, the Tariff 
Commission agreed with the complainant and found the California 
producers to be a separate industry. Even though the complainant 
was a marginal producer who had not made consistent profits when 
there had been no import competition, the requisite degree of 
injury was found.34 The decision seems questionable, both as a 
matter of statutory interpretation and as a matter of policy. The 
act does not purport to provide relief for a producer or group of 
producers who may be injured by import competition; it speaks 
of relief only for an "industry." The Commission has consistently 
held in escape-clause cases that "industry" refers to the national 
market for a product or to a large regional market area.85 As a 
matter of policy it would seem preferable to allow one marginal 
producer to go out of business rather than to subject all of a 
country's exports of a product to the United States to an added 
burden, and to create suspicion of American sincerity about the 
liberal trade policy this country espouses. As a final chapter, the 
Customs Court rejected an importer's attempt to restrict the 
finding to imported pipe directly competitive with the California 
pipe.36 
34 ENKE &: SALERA, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 402-03 (1947) • For a more vivid charac-
terization of the complainant's business morality and record of bankruptcies there is a 
statement by an importer who was severely damaged by the soil-pipe finding. Hearings on 
R.R. 6006, 6007 and 5120 Before the Rouse Committee on Ways and Means, 85th Cong., 
1st Sess. 95 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Rouse Hearings]. 
35 In 1955 Congress resolved a split in the Tariff Commission by allowing a firm 
making a profit on its entire operation to complain about import competition injuring 
one product line in escape-clause proceedings. No other narrowing of the definition of 
"industry" was suggested. Trade .Agreements Extension Act, 69 Stat. 166 (1955) , 19 
U.S.C. § 1364(e) (1958). 
36 Ellis K. Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 43 Cust. Ct. 548 (1959) (Reappraisement 
Decision No. 9544) , afj'd, 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961) • 
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As a result of the soil-pipe case and other cases many interested 
parties have urged some definition of the terms "injury" and "in-
dustry" by statute or regulation. 31 The Treasury has opposed 
any such definition because it would force taking of "a rigid posi-
tion on the side of the protectionists or the free traders" which is 
not justified by "legislative history or by conditions as they exist 
today."38 There is some merit to this position, especially with 
respect to putting definitions in the act itself, for as the Treasury's 
spokesman says, "Definitions are limitations."39 But even admit-
ting that this is so, there seems to be no good reason why some 
minimal standards could not be enunciated by the Commission. 
Having decided more than 100 escape-clause cases under the Re-
ciprocal Trade Agreements Act and more than fifteen cases under 
the Antidumping Act, the Commission has obviously worked out 
some guidelines. The regulations would not have to be narrow or 
picayune; they could be general, as is the escape-clause legislation 
which lists the factors to be considered by the Commission in 
escape-clause decisions. The promulgation of regulations would 
have several beneficial results in addition to deterring decisions 
similar to the one in the soil-pipe case. First, it would give Con-
gress an opportunity to review the approach of the Commission 
and to alter it if necessary. Second, it would reduce harassment 
by such marginal producers as the complainant in the soil-pipe 
case who have nothing to lose by filing a complaint and may gain 
if appraisements are withheld, even if there is a subsequent finding 
of no injury. For example, in the rayon staple fiber case domestic 
firms producing ninety-five percent of the domestic fiber affirma-
tively volunteered the opinion that there was no basis for a finding 
of injury to domestic industry from imports of French fiber, and 
even went so far as to call the filing of a complaint by the minority 
producers "vindictive."40 Previously published regulations might 
have prevented filing of the complaint altogether, or at least might 
have resulted in a speedy dismissal. The importance of preventing 
the filing of harassing complaints was pointed out by counsel for 
the Swedish hardboard and rayon importers;41 he testified that the 
31 An array of proposals is presented in House Hearings 115, 369 (favorable to the 
soil-pipe decision) ; id. at 199, 395 (unfavorable) • 
38 House Hearings 18. 
30 Ibid. No representative of the Tariff Commission appears to have testified. 
40 1960 TARIFF COMMISSION ANN, REP. 36-37. 
41 Hearings on H.R. 6006 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 85th Cong., 
2d Sess. 118 (1958) (statement of Robert L. Brightman) • 
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rayon importers had been injured fully as much by the withhold-
ing of appraisements as were the hardboard importers who had 
been subjected to an actual finding of dumping.42 Trade is inter-
rupted upon the filing of a complaint because the importer can-
not determine his total costs until he learns whether a dumping 
duty will be payable; without knowing his costs he is forced to 
stop importing since the later payment of a duty may mean that 
he has sold the imported goods at a loss. Even after an investiga-
tion results in a negative finding, the original channels of trade 
might not be reopened if the producer has had to alter his produc-
tion and marketing methods to meet consumer demands of differ-
ing countries. The third beneficial result of Commission regu-
lations would be to enable the importer to evaluate his position 
more accurately. An importer of British soil pipe has contended 
that he relied on the fact that only four-tenths percent of the total 
consumption in the United States was provided by British im-
ports.43 He was probably justified in anticipating a finding of 
no injury since there had been twenty-five dismissals of dumping 
complaints on the ground of negligible import volume between 
1934 and 1957.44 
One other aspect of the requirement of injury deserves men-
tion. It has been suggested that injury to a domestic industry may 
not always be necessary for the dumping to be harmful. Let us 
assume that country A sells tin to country B at a dumping price. 
B either has no tin industry or has an industry which is unable 
to show an injury, but the industry of country C which ordinarily 
supplies B will be severely injured. Since there is no injury to a 
domestic industry, B would not impose a dumping duty. In con-
ventional economic terms, B is justified in refusing to impose a 
duty, since the gain to its consumers is not offset by any damage 
to its industry. But if we call the countries Russia (A), the United 
States (B) and Bolivia (C), the context changes. No longer are 
these countries merely economic units, each seeking to maximize 
its own economic well-being. The United States has a political 
42 An appraisement is the appraising officer's formal designation of the value and 
quantity of imported merchandise and the assignment of the merchandise to the proper 
dutiable classification. 46 Stat. 729 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1500 (1958). The 
proper classification, in cases where dumping is suspected, cannot be known until the 
investigation is completed and a decision is reached as to whether dumping has occurred. 
43 House Hearings 93-94. 
44 ENKE &: SALERA, op. cit. supra note 34, at 401-02. 
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interest in the strength of the Bolivian tin industry which supports 
the Bolivian economy.45 Viner poses this problem and suggests 
that the solution may be in "international action," although he 
concedes that only predatory dumping should be outlawed, and he 
acknowledges the difficulties of classification based on intent.46 In-
ternational action seems unlikely though, since countries such as 
Bolivia would hesitate to bind themselves in a bilateral agreement 
which, in return for a similar agreement by the United States, 
would protect an American industry by penalizing Bolivian con-
sumers; and it would be unseemly for the United States to extort 
some other concession from Bolivia in exchange for an American 
pledge to protect the Bolivian tin industry. 
Considering the strength of the United States and the purchas-
ing power of its consumers, a unilateral approach may be appro-
priate. A possible solution would be to allow application to the 
Secretary of the Treasury by importers of goods from the third 
country whose industry is injured, as domestic industry can apply 
now. The Secretary would make the finding of sales for less than 
fair value and the Tariff Commission of injury to the industry 
of the third country. There would be difficulties, such as getting 
accurate information from the third country, but Treasury attaches 
abroad have collected similar data for such purposes as computing 
foreign firms' costs of production, and these technical problems 
could probably be overcome. It is certain that the third country 
would respond readily to requests for information showing injury, 
just as domestic producers do now. At this point an additional 
step is necessary, since the procedure is designed to aid our foreign 
policy: the President would be given the power, as under the 
escape clause and flexible tariff procedures, to affirm the finding or 
not, taking into consideration our relations with the exporting 
country and the injured third country. 
IV. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 
The act directs the Secretary to make an investigation when he 
has reason to believe that there is dumping. He may act on in-
411 The importance of this aspect of the act and of providing for it by statute before 
a crisis arises was suggested to the author by Mr. William Barnhard of the Washington, 
D.C. Bar. 
46 VINER, MEMORANDUM, op. cit. supra note 7, at 19. This seems to be the only dis• 
cussion of the matter, although its relevance was recognized by the framers of article VI 
of GATT. A discussion of the relation of the act to this provision of GATT is found 
below. 
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formation submitted by an appraiser or other officer, on informa-
tion submitted by a third party (usually a domestic producer) , 
or on his own motion. On starting the investigation, he is author-
ized to withhold appraisement on goods entered up to 120 days 
before the question of dumping was first presented to him, and he 
must publish notice that the question has been raised.47 If the 
Secretary finds sales for less than fair value, he notifies the Tariff 
Commission which has three months to determine "after such 
investigation as it deems necessary" whether a domestic industry 
is being, or is likely to be, injured because of the dumping.48 An 
affirmative finding of injury requires the Secretary to publish the 
determination of sales for less than fair value and of injury, which 
publication then authorizes the customs officials to assess a dump-
ing duty, as described in section 202 (a) .49 
The act does not establish the procedural steps to be followed 
in the determination of sales for less than fair value or of injury. 
It was settled early that the Secretary of the Treasury (who until 
1955 made both determinations) could conduct investigations as 
he chose, granting a hearing if he felt it necessary and revealing 
to the importer only so much of the information on which he 
based his findings as he pleased.110 This position was not seriously 
questioned until recently. 
In 1958 an importer attacked a finding of dumping by contend-
ing that the Secretary's failure to comply with the requirements 
of the Administrative Procedure Act rendered the finding void.111 
47 Antidumping Act of 1921, § 201 (b) , amended by 68 Stat. 1139 (1954) , as amended, 
19 U.S.C. § 160 (b) (1958) • The requirement of notice was added in 1958. Act of 
August 14, 1958, § 201 (b) (2), 72 Stat. 583 (1958). 
48 Antidumping Act of 1921, § 201 (a) , amended by 68 Stat. 1138 (1954) , as amended, 
19 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1958). This language differs from that of the escape clause by 
which the Tariff Commission is directed to hold hearings as well as investigations. 65 
Stat. 74 (1951), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1364 (1958). 
49 Antidumping Act of 1921, § 302 (a) , amended by 68 Stat. 1139 (1954) , as amended, 
19 U.S.C. § 161 {a) (1958) • 
ISO Kreutz v. Durning, 69 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1934), affirming Kreutz v. Elting, 3 
F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); Kleberg v. United States, 21 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 110, 71 
F.2d 332 (1933). The opinion by the trial judge in the Kleberg case was a vigorous 
attack on the Secretary's refusal to allow the importers to see the information on which 
the finding was based; he declared the finding void for lack of evidence to support it. 
T.D. 45387, 61 TREAS. DEc. 58 (Cust. Ct. 1932). This approach was reversed by the 
appellate division of the Customs Court and the finding was reinstated. The Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals agreed with the appellate division. The view taken by the 
trial judge has not been heard again judicially. 
111 Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 41 Cust. Ct. 519 (1958) • Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958). 
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In Elof-Hansson v. United States the Customs Court upheld the 
Secretary's action and held the APA inapplicable to investigations 
under the act, 52 citing earlier cases which had granted complete 
discretion to the Secretary. The Third Division of the Customs 
Court reversed, holding that the AP A is applicable to the Secre-
tary's investigation; that the investigation and finding are rule-
making; and that noncompliance with the AP A vitiated the find-
ing even though the importer was not prejudiced thereby.158 The 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals recently reversed and re-
instated the decision of the trial court, but the ground of decision 
was explicitly made the importer's failure to show prejudice result-
ing from the Secretary's noncompliance.154 The court expressly 
refused to decide whether the AP A is applicable to the act; that 
question is still open. It is relevant to future investigations, since 
the failure to proceed according to the APA was not mere inad-
vertence by the Secretary; he acknowledges that he does not comply 
with its requirements.1515 
In determining whether to accept the view of the trial court 
or the Third Division, the first question is whether the Secretary 
is an agency within the meaning of section 2 (a) of the APA which 
reads in part: 
" 'Agency' means each authority (whether or not within or 
subject to review by another agency) of the Government of 
the United States .... Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
to repeal delegations of authority as provided by law.''1511 
The breadth of this definition and the intent of Congress to 
standardize all administrative procedure would seem to warrant 
inclusion of the Secretary of the Treasury. Other Cabinet mem-
bers have been held subject to the AP A.157 Although it has been 
112 Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, supra note 51, at 528. 
118 Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 43 Cust. Ct. 627, 178 F. Supp. 922 (1959). 
114 "[It is] unnecessary to pass upon either the issue of applicability of the A.P.A. to an 
antidumping investigation ••• or the issue of whether or not the finding of dumping 
was 'rule-making' as defined in the A.P.A . ... " 48 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 91, 296 F.2d 779 
(1960). 
1111 The Treasury's position was made clear before the House Committee. The Treas• 
ury's representative was asked if it was his position that determinations by the Secretary 
and the Tariff Commission "are entirely up to those agencies" with "no right of appeal." 
He was also asked if the AP A is completely bypassed. :Both answers were affirmative. 
House Hearings 45. 
1111 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (a} (1958). 
117 Cates v. Haderlein, 189 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1951) (Postmaster General); United 
424 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
held that the Tariff Commission, acting as adviser to the President 
under the flexible tariff and unfair competition statutes, is not an 
- agency because it advises rather than ordains, this reasoning does 
not apply to the Secretary; his action is more than advice-it is 
authorization for the assessment and collection of a duty. It is sub-
ject only to a Tariff Commission finding, not the absolute discre-
tion of the President.58 
- In view of the long history of agitation for reform of the ad-
ministrative process that culminated in the AP A, and in view of 
the direction given the statute by the Supreme Court, 59 the pre-
sumption is that an agency is subject to its provisions. The cases 
relied on by the trial court to sustain the Secretary's absolute 
discretion lose their meaning after the adoption of the AP A, since 
Congress expressly indicated that "Any inconsistent agency action 
or statute is in effect repealed."60 The trial court's strongest point 
was that if the AP A applies to the act, Congress would have had 
no reason to amend section 201 (b) to require notice of an investi-
gation by the Secretary. The Third Division's reply is that the 
AP A has set the policy of notice and the requirement in section 
201 (b) is supplemental to that policy. Although not spelled out 
by the court, this reply may be explained by the language of the 
two statutes: the AP A requires notice only if interested parties 
are not otherwise informed,61 while the section 201 (b) require-
ment is unqualified and therefore more stringent than the usual 
AP A mandate. In spite of the tenuousness of this argument, the 
strong congressional policy in favor of uniform administrative 
procedure and the Supreme Court's pronouncement that "Exemp-
tions from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not 
lightly to be presumed ... " 62 should be enough to support it. 
If it is decided that the AP A is applicable, it is necessary to 
States v. Libby, McNeil &: Libby, 107 F. Supp. 697 (D. Alaska 1952) (Secretary of the 
Interior). 
58 The House Judiciary Committee report makes it clear that the second sentence of 
§ 2 (a) provides nothing to the contrary, since it "does not mean that the • • • 
requirements provided by the [Administrative Procedure Act] may be avoided." House 
Committee on the Judiciary, Report on Administrative Procedure Act Bill, H.R. REP. 
No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1946) • 
59 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950) • The Court stresses that "one 
purpose was to introduce • • • uniformity of procedure and standardization of adminis• 
trative practice among the diverse agencies .••• " Id. at 41. 
60 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 281 (1946) . 
61 APA § 4 (a), 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (a) (1958). 
62 Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955). 
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categorize the Secretary's procedure as rule-making or adjudica-
tion. The applicable part of the definition of a rule is in section 
2 (c) of the APA. It is extremely broad: 
"Rule means the whole or any part of any agency state-
ment of general or particular applicability and future effect 
designated to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or 
policy .... "63 
The words "or particular" seem to extend rule-making to almost 
every agency action, but the reasons for not reading those words 
literally "are overwhelming."64 The words were inserted to make 
certain that rules addressed to named persons would not, by virtue 
of that fact alone, be interpreted as adjudication.65 There seems 
to be general agreement that the traditional, pre-AP A distinctions 
between rule-making and adjudication still apply.66 A good de-
scription of those distinctions is made by one commentator on 
administrative procedure who states that rule-making is character-
ized by its essentially legislative nature, applicability to future con-
duct by drawing predictions from present facts, and concern with 
considerations of policy.67 The requirement in section 2 (b) that 
a rule have "future effect" does not mean that an agency cannot 
deal "with past transactions in prescribing rules for the future." 68 
Although it might be argued that the finding of the Secretary is 
adjudication as to the importer whose merchandise is already sub-
ject to the finding (due to the prior withholding of appraisement), 
the finding is clearly phrased and intended to cover all merchan-
dise of a specific type from a specific country, including but not 
confined to the goods on which appraisement has been with-
held. 69 In terms of general applicability, as distinguished from the 
63 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (c) (1958). 
64 I DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 5.02, at 295 (1958). Since adjudication is, by the 
definition in § 2 (d) , only that which is not rule-making, a literal reading of § 2 (c) 
would dispense with the hearing required by § 5 in most cases, and this would defeat 
the very purpose of the AP A. 
65 House Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Administrative Procedure Act 
Bill, H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1946) • 
66 Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949); 1 DAVIS, op. cit. 
supra note 66, § 5.02, at 296; Ginnane, "Rule-Making," "Adjudication" and Exemptions 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 621 (1947). 
67 Ginnane, supra note 66, at 630. There is strong support for this analysis in the 
legislative history. See S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1946) • 
68 House Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Administrative Procedure Act 
Bill, H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 n.l (1946) • 
69 The cases offer an importer making this argument no support. Willapoint Oysters, 
426 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
settlement of present rights, the Secretary seems to qualify as a 
rule maker.70 
The main effects of the application of section 4 (rule-making) 
to the Secretary would be threefold: (1) A "concise general state-
ment" of the "basis" of a rule must be published.71 This language 
is ambiguous, but the history makes it clear that this is to be "fully 
explanatory of the complete factual and legal basis" for the rule 
so that the persons affected will know "the basic justification" for 
the rules.72 This is important for the importer who must know 
the factual grounding of the Secretary's finding before he can ef-
fectively attack it in court or even present rebuttal evidence to 
support a motion for revocation of the finding. The customary 
form of the finding gives an importer no indication of what infor-
mation the Secretary has rel,ied on. 73 (2) Section 4 requires the 
Secretary to make provision for a revocation procedure. Although 
the Secretary does from time to time revoke a finding in whole or 
in part, a more formal requirement could make this procedure 
more effective. (3) The courts have been very hesitant to impose 
any standards on the Secretary. The APA, on the other hand, re-
quires the courts to exercise some measure of judicial review in 
order to protect the interests of those affected by administrative 
action.74 
In addition to the three points above, there are two other 
aspects of procedure on which the AP A might have some effect. 
First, the Secretary would be required to receive relevant data 
Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949); George A. Rheman Co. v. United States, 133 
F. Supp. 668 (E.D.S.C. 1955) . 
70 There is a third possibility in addition to rule-making and adjudication: ministerial, 
non-discretionary action. Ginnane, supra note 66, at 634. Although the Secretary comes 
close to that category with the mathematical computation of fair value, drawing conclu-
sions from relevant data is still a job requiring a degree of discretionary skill. 
71 APA § 4 (b), 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (b) (1958). 
72 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, 225 (1946) (emphasis added) • 
73 None of the operative language of a published finding is omitted in this example. 
To Collectors of Customs and Others Concerned: 
After due investigation ••• the United States Tariff Commission ••• notified 
the Secretary of the Treasury of its determination that the industry manufacturing 
cast-iron soil pipe in the United States is being, or is likely to be injured, by reason 
of the importation into the United States of cast-iron soil pipe from the United 
Kingdom . 
• • • I find that cast-iron soil pipe •.• from the United Kingdom is being, or 
is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value. 
David Kendall 
Acting Secretary of the Treasury 
'H APA § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 -U.S.C. § 1009 (1958). 
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from interested parties. This is probably not too important, since 
there is already the practice of receiving information from im-
porters, 75 and, although section 4 of the AP A requires the Secre-
tary to consider such data, there is no way to enforce such a man-
date. 76 Second, the necessity of retroactivity in applying a finding 
to goods on which appraisements have been withheld in order to 
make the act effective seems to nullify the requirement of section 
4 (c) that a finding be published 30 days before it becomes effec-
tive;77 but section 4 (c) may mean that the importers would have 
30 days in which to try to persuade the Secretary to reconsider 
before duties are assessed, and during this period, for the first time, 
they should surely have access to the evidence on which the Secre-
tary relied. 
All of the discussion of the procedure of the Secretary and of 
the applicability of the AP A would apply with equal force to the 
Tariff Commission's determination of injury but for one phrase in 
section 201 (a) of the act: the Commission is directed to make only 
"such investigation as it deems necessary."78 It thus appears that 
Congress intended to give the Commission more discretion than 
it gave the Secretary, since no similar freedom is given the Secre-
tary by the language of the act, and the language pertaining to the 
Commission was enacted after the passage of the AP A. This con-
clusion is in accord with the customary view of the courts, which 
has been to grant as much freedom as possible to the Commission, 
as well as to the Secretary. If the AP A does apply to the Commis-
sion so that the factual basis of its finding must be disclosed, the 
Commission would be forced to reveal what it has always treated as 
confidential information about the profits and production of do-
mestic firms. 
V. RELATION OF THE AcT TO CURRENT TRADE Poucy 
The twentieth century has seen the executive branch of the 
federal government develop an American liberal trade policy to 
75 GATT, ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES 128. This publication contains information submitted 
by the Secretary concerning the administration of the act. Statutes and administration in 
other countries are also included. 
76 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), which gives the history of the entire 
Morgan litigation. 
77 APA § 4 (c), 60 Stat. 239, 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (c} (1958). 
78 Antidumping Act of 1921, § 201 (a) , amended by 60 Stat. 1138 (1954) , as amended, 
19 U.S.C. § 160 (a) (1958). 
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an unparalleled extent. Three major manifestations of this trend 
are shown by participation in the following programs: (I) the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, (2) bilateral treaties with an 
unconditional most-favored-nation clause, and (3) the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. All three of these developed 
after the passage of the Antidumping Act. Two sets of questions 
must therefore be answered concerning the relation of these pro-
grams of executive action to the terms and administration of the 
act: first, whether there is a conflict between the act and the inter-
national obligations assumed subsequent to it; and second, whether 
these obligations mark such a radical change since 1921 that the 
aims and methods of the act are no longer consistent with our over-
all trade and foreign policies. 
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act79 does not seem to 
present any conflict with the Antidumping Act. It gives the Presi-
dent the power to negotiate tariff reductions with other countries, 
which reductions are then applied generally. This act also pro-
vides its own machinery for preventing injury to American indus-
try caused by the reduction of tariff rates, in the form of an escape 
clause.80 The negotiated rate reductions are just that: against the 
background of other relevant customs laws of both countries, each 
country bargains for reductions on a quid pro quo basis. It is 
reasonable to assume that the escape-clause remedy was meant to 
be exclusive, i.e., after the President has responded to the plight 
of a domestic industry by raising the rate--either to, above or 
below its level before the negotiated reduction-a finding of 
dumping should not be made with regard to merchandise compet-
ing with the domestic industry. Since the purchase price for pur-
poses of the Antidumping Act does not include import duties, 
this is not a necessary interpretation; as a matter of strict logic it 
is possible that an industry may be so competitively weak that a 
finding of injury may be made twice. Thus, if a firm is selling in 
the United States at a dumping price at the time that an escape-
clause proceeding raises the duty to the point deemed necessary 
to protect domestic industry, none of that duty is included in the 
79 48 Stat. 943 (1934), as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-64 (1958). 
so 65 Stat. 73 (1951), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1363 (1958) • 
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purchase price; therefore, there is, technically, still dumping. As 
a matter of reconciling the policies of the two statutes, however, 
it is doubtful whether such domestic industry deserves, or was 
intended by Congress to receive, so high a degree of protection.81 
The converse, however, does not follow. Even though a finding of 
dumping has been made, it is possible that a reduced tariff rate 
may be found too low to give adequate protection to American 
industry. The amount of the dumping duty is limited to the 
statutory differences between purchase price and foreign value, 
while the President is given extreme flexibility by the Trade 
Agreements Act, including authority to raise the duty above that 
which prevailed before the reduction negotiated by the trade 
agreement. 
The Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Clause in Tariff Treaties 
The United States has negotiated many tariff treaties. The pro-
vision which is relevant to the act is found in all the treaties, ex-
pressly or by implication. It is the unconditional most-favored-
nation clause (m.f.n.) .82 The question, for our purposes, is 
whether an unconditional m.f.n. clause necessarily outlaws dump-
ing duties as to merchandise brought under the clause, due to the 
fact that countries not subject to the finding of dumping may sell 
their goods without paying the dumping duty. 
There are two American cases in this general area. The first is 
John T. Bill Co. v. United States.88 In that case a contingent duty 
81 Although the specific exception of goods encompassed by a trade agreement from 
the flexible tariff might seem to indicate that other statutes, like the Antidumping Act, 
are to continue in force, the reasons given in the text seem persuasive here, too, i.e., it 
would contradict the logic of the statutes, passed at different points in our tariff history, 
to allow any domestic industry that much protection. 
82 Abbreviated in the literature and hereinafter: m.f.n. Since 1923 the United States 
policy has been to provide for unconditional m.f.n. treatment. Walker, Modem Treaties 
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 805 (1958) • But even as to 
treaties dating from before 1923 the terms of such an unconditional clause mean that 
treaties containing conditional clauses automatically are made unconditional. For the 
explanation of this fact, see Catudal, The Most-Favored-Nation Clause and the Courts, 
35 AM. J. INTL. L. 41, 48 (1941). 
The clause is typically phrased thus: "Articles • • • shall not be subjected, upon 
importation ••• [to] higher duties or charges of any kind ••• more burdensome than 
those to which the like articles ••• of any other foreign country are subject. • • • All the 
provisions of this agreement providing for most-favored-nation treatment shall be in• 
terpreted as meaning that such treatment shall be accorded immediately and uncon-
ditionally, without request or compensation." The quotation contains the operative 
language of articles II (1) and VI of the Trade Agreement with Great Britain, Nov. 17, 
1938, 54 Stat. 1897, 1899, 1900, E.A.S. No. 164. 
83 27 C.C.P .A. (Customs) 26, 104 F.2d 67 (1939) • 
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was imposed on German bicycles.84 This contingent duty section 
(since repealed) allows the United States to retaliate against other 
countries whose tariff rate on bicycles is higher than the American 
rate; the duty may be raised to equal that of the other country.85 
The importer argued that the contingent duty was a violation of 
the United States-German treaty which contained an unconditional 
m.f.n. clause. It had previously been held that a conditional m.f.n. 
clause was not a bar to the assessment of a contingent duty,86 and 
the Customs Court found no distinction between the two types of 
m.f.n. clauses.87 In reversing, the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals pointed out that the adoption of the unconditional m.f.n. 
form in American treaties was a conscious choice designed to sub-
stantiate our claim of leadership in promoting trade and to make 
the m.f.n. clause fully effective.88 It went on to hold that the 
contingent duty provision is totally inconsistent with the pledge 
of economic non-discrimination made by the unconditional m.f.n. 
clause, especially since the exceptions to the clause specified by 
the treaty do not include contingent duties. The reason for this 
decision is clear. Contingent duties are not imposed to neutralize 
some artificial impediment to competition, nor do they bear a 
rational relation to the tariff structure of the importing country; 
they are based on a factor-the tariff rate of the exporting country 
-that is no more relevant to the tariff rate of the importing 
country than other tariff policies of the exporting country. In 
other words, the penalty-duty is not intended to compensate for 
inroads on competition, but to retaliate for unrelated irritants. 
The reasoning of the Bill case does not apply to countervailing 
duties. In such cases, the government of the exporting country 
seeks to erode the free competition supposedly guaranteed by both 
contracting governments in the m.f.n. clause, by granting an ex-
port bounty, and to offset that bounty the importing country im-
poses a countervailing duty. In the second case on the m.f.n. stand-
ard, Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States,89 the Bill case was 
84 The court refers to the duty as "countervailing,". but recognizes its error in termi-
nology in Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 31 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 63, 136 F.2d 
1019 (1943) • 
85 Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 944. 
86 Minerva Automobiles, Inc. v. United States, 25 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 324 (1938). 
8'1' John T. Bill Co. v. United States, T .D. 48680, 70 TREAS. DEC. 814 (1936) • 
ss Although the point was not argued, the court held the treaty to be self-executing. 
Catudal, supra note 82, at 54. 
89 31 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 63, 136 F.2d 1019 (1943). 
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distinguished on this ground and the countervailing duty was al-
lowed to stand. The case of the dumping duty seems poised 
between contingent and countervailing duties: it is not unrelated 
to the present import, but it is not to redress evasion of the m.f.n. 
standard by the other government. No case has really discussed the 
subject, but it seems to be assumed that dumping duties are con-
sistent with an unconditional m.f.n. clause. 90 
An argument that dumping duties are in violation of the m.f.n. 
clause, at least in some instances, can be made: The Balfour case 
rests on an estoppel of a government that grants an export bounty 
to protest the duty assessed to neutralize that bounty. There is no 
governmental assistance to a producer who exports at a dumping 
price, and therefore the antidumping duty cannot be a means of 
retaliating against a government which has itself violated the 
m.f.n. standard. Like the producer who is made liable for a 
contingent duty, the producer subject to a dumping duty is merely 
competing in a way that he anticipates will be successful. The only 
difference, and thus the only reason that a dumping duty may be 
justified, is that the importing country has categorized his price as 
"unfair." It must be remembered, though, that the unconditional 
m.f.n. clause is an absolute guarantee that the importing country 
will, under no circumstances ( except for countervailing duties, 
for the reasons above) exact higher duties from this country than 
from another. In other words, strict neutrality is imposed on the 
importing country as between importers. The compatibility of a 
dumping duty with the m.f.n. standard turns on whether the 
dumping is really "unfair." It seems reasonable to say that dump-
ing caused by an honest effort to meet competition in the import-
ing country is not so "unfair" that it should be allowed to be 
condemned when there is such a m.f.n. clause; as in the contingent 
duty situation, the penalty is not tailored to the offense-there is, 
in fact, no offense. This is a further argument for the competitive-
price theory that defines fair value in such a way as to exclude 
from findings of dumping sales at prices pegged to meet compe-
tition. 
Whether this argument would be accepted is doubtful. The 
Secretary has given no indication that fair value will be redefined. 
oo H.R. REP. No. 1000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1934); Schwarzenberger, The Most-
Favored-Nation Standard in British State Practice, 22 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 114 (1945). 
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And the courts have not been concerned with arguments this 
complex.91 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
A final inquiry into the act's compatibility with present Ameri-
can trade policy concerns the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) .92 Since GATT has a provision authorizing the 
levying of dumping duties, the task here is to see if the American 
act and the GATT provision conflict. Article VI of GATT is 
very similar to the act.93 It allows an importing country to levy 
a dumping duty on the difference between "normal value" (home 
consumption price, price to third countries, or cost of production) 
and the purchase price, provided there is "material injury" to a 
domestic industry. The only critical difference is that article VI 
requires a finding of "material injury," while the act demands 
only a finding of "injury." Since the definition of neither term is 
precise, this divergence in wording would not seem important. 
Some countries have an even less strict requirement of injury than 
the United States: Australia, for example, requires only a "detri-
ment" to a domestic industry, and Canada only that 10 percent 
of the class of goods be produced domestically.94 In view of this 
disparity in terminology, and the fact that only one country 
(Sweden) specifies "material injury,"95 it would be pedantic to 
say that a minor semantic difference means that a country's statute 
violates article VI. The Department of State has taken this posi-
tion and has stated that the difference in wording is permissible.911 
Consistency With National Trade Policy 
Although it is important to be sure that the act does not, in 
terms, conflict with our international commitments, an equally 
important question is whether the administration of the act con-
91 In the Bill and Balfour cases, for example, there is practically no discussion of why 
contingent duties are, and countervailing duties are not, in violation of the unconditional 
m.f.n. standard. 
92 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T .I.A.S. 
No. 1700. 
93 A helpful booklet on antidumping statutes in other countries and the GATT 
provision in article VI is published by GATT. GATT, .ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES. 
94 Id. at 17. 
95 Ibid. 
96 House Hearings 85. 
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flicts with the basic trade policy manifested by those commitments. 
Of course, the act is not as glaring an example of protectionism as 
the flexible tariff or the retention of some of the high rates of duty 
of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff. But the question remains whether the 
degree to which trade is curtailed by the act is desirable for a 
great trading nation. 
Between 1934 and 1956 there were 198 cases processed by the 
Secretary, under the Anti-dumping Act. Only eight, or four per-
cent, resulted in findings of dumping.G7 But the disruption to the 
normal channels of trade cannot be computed. Few importers 
would be so rash as to continue buying while a dumping investi-
gation was in progress, since their total costs cannot be known 
until they learn whether a dumping duty is payable. The curtail-
ing of trade by the act must be measured by the number of in-
vestigations, not by the number of affirmative findings that dump-
ing exists and is injuring a domestic industry. And the amount of 
unjustifiable interference with trade must be measured by the 
number of investigations which result in no finding. Naturally, 
there will be some negative investigations, but the fact that only 
one investigation in twenty-five has resulted in a finding of dump-
ing suggests that there are basic defects in the administration of 
the act. 
The reinterpretations of fair value and injury advocated above 
are directed toward the discouragement or quick dismissal of 
complaints that today are likely to proceed to a full investigation. 
The position implicit throughout this discussion is that there 
should be a presumption in favor of an uninterrupted flow of trade. 
Such a position would be fully consistent with our international 
trade obligations which have been developing for the past several 
decades. And even if our trade policy did not indicate the efficacy 
of such a presumption, surely the experience under the act has 
shown such a presumption to be justified, since over ninety percent 
of the complaints have been dismissed. 
There are also other ways in which the administration of the 
act could be tightened to protect importers, while not prevent-
ing findings of dumping when such findings are justified. The 
regulations provide for a preliminary investigation to determine 
whether a complaint has "reasonable grounds" to support it.98 This 
97 GATT, ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES 129. 
98 19 C.F.R. § 14.6 (d) (1961), T .D. 55118, 95 TREAS. DEC. 229 (1960). 
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is necessary, says the Treasury, "since price data and conditions 
of sale in the foreign market are not usually available" to domestic 
producers.99 In view of the percentage of complaints which pass 
the preliminary stage and result in no finding, the "reasonable 
grounds" standard apparently has not been too rigorously applied. 
In effect, the Treasury gives a domestic producer a free shot at 
his foreign competition-at the least he can cut down import 
competition during the period of the investigation since importers 
will stop buying while appraisements are withheld. The solution, 
although it may seem hard on the domestic producer, may be to 
require a complaint to include solid evidence that it is not merely 
shooting in the dark. 
That domestic producers do in fact enter complaints of dump-
ing based on no more than anger over foreign competition seems 
clear. In 1919 the Tariff Commission made a study of dumping. 
It received allegations of dumping from 146 domestic producers 
and trade associations and on investigation found only twenty-three 
to be actual cases of dumping.100 The Commission concluded that 
domestic producers "evidence a tendency to complain indiscrimi-
nately ... of every form of successful foreign competition."101 
This tendency seems to be a natural one. During recent periods, 
for example, Australia rejected 101 of ll0 complaints (92%) 
and South Africa rejected 211 of 240 complaints (88%) .102 
As a method of favoring the resumption of trade after a find-
ing has issued, it has been suggested that the finding apply only to 
the firms that are actually dumping, not to the entire industry 
of a country.108 The Secretary has apparently recognized the 
validity of such an approach by publishing periodic withdrawals 
of the finding on Swedish hardboard as to specific Swedish produ-
cers,104 and recently by restricting the finding in the Belgian 
cement case;1015 but the findings in other cases are still phrased to 
apply to an entire industry of a country. If the presumption in 
99 GATT, ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES 127. 
100 U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, DUMPING AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 12-13 (1919). 
101 Id. at 18. 
102 GATT, ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES 14. 
103 Testimony by the respected student of trade policy, George Bronz, House Hear-
ings 385-87. 
104 T .D. 54168, 91 TREAS. DEC. 305 (1956) ; T .D. 54199, 91 TREAS, DEC. 338 (1956) ; 
T .D. 55006, 94 TREAS. DEC. 602 (1959); T .D. 55019, 95 TREAS. DEC. 9 (1959) ; T .D. 55115, 
95 TREAS. DEC. 225 (1960) • 
1011 26 Fed. Reg. 5102 (1961) • 
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favor of trade, rather than of dumping, prevailed, the burden 
would be on the Secretary (and thus on the domestic producers) 
to show that specific foreign producers should come within a find-
ing, not on the importer to show that his vendor has done nothing 
wrong. The form of the finding106 would be altered to provide for 
the naming of specific foreign firms. No evidence has been found 
to support the Secretary's assumption that dumping by one foreign 
firm is reason to suspect other firms of the same industry and 
country of dumping: the Swedish hardboard experience seems to 
indicate that the opposite is true. 
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the act is its lack of a 
mechanism to bring it within the framework of our larger trade 
and foreign policies. Unlike the escape clause, there is no presi-
dential review. The advantage of submission to the President 
before publishing a finding would be twofold: the President could 
subordinate a finding of dumping to total policy, and he could 
neutralize the protectionist amendments which Congress has added 
to the act in deference to domestic pressures.107 
There are at least four types of cases in which a presidential 
review of a finding of dumping would be valuable. First, when 
the goods are exported by an ally whose good will we cultivate. 
The President might be advised by the State Department that 
prospective concessions in trade or other areas are more valuable 
to the country than the finding of dumping in this particular case. 
Second, where there is an overriding national policy. Assume 
that the Tariff Commission made a finding of injury to an industry 
located in a chronically depressed area, and the national policy 
concerning that area was to offer inducements to relocation of 
the work force. Shutting off import competition might result in 
a temporary revival of the injured industry, to the short-term 
advantage but long-term disadvantage of the area and of national 
planning. 
Third, in the case of countries which depend heavily on Ameri-
can purchases for their economic viability. The example above of 
American concern for the Bolivian tin industry points up the fact 
106 Note 73 supra. 
101 It is this presidential review which, in the opinion of one commentator, has 
prevented the escape clause from all but nullifying the advantages of the Trade Agree-
ments Act. Gardner, Organizing World Trade-A Challenge for American Lawyers, 12 
REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 202, 219 (1957). 
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that our foreign policy is closely tied to trade policy, especially in 
our relations with countries which rely heavily on the export of 
one or two commodities. It is here that an indirect injury due to 
dumping (i.e., where the industry of a third country is injured 
by sales at a dumping price to the United States) may be pre-
vented. In view of the considerations involved, it would be unwise 
to vest ultimate authority for this kind of finding in officials of 
the Treasury and Tariff Commission, none of whom are in a 
position to gauge the overall effects of the finding on our total 
policy. Article VI of GATT contains an exception for just such a 
case; it allows the contracting parties (acting jointly) to waive the 
requirement of material injury to a domestic industry if an in-
dustry of another contracting party is materially injured.108 Pre-
sumably, in cases serious enough for the United States to impose a 
dumping duty even though no domestic industry is injured, the 
assent of the contracting parties would be forthcoming. If the ex-
porting country were not a member of GATT, approval by the 
contracting parties would be unnecessary. For these purposes, it 
is relevant to note that Czechoslovakia is the only member of the 
Communist bloc belonging to GATT. 
Fourth, in our trade relations with underdeveloped countries. 
As these countries begin to produce more manufactured goods, 
they will seek foreign markets, as has India with her cotton goods. 
The economist Gunnar Myrdal points out that for the economi-
cally advanced countries to prevent the importation of such goods 
would be unsound from the viewpoints of an international division 
of labor and instilling a spirit of enterprise into the developing 
economies.109 He predicts that these countries will press for a 
redefinition of dumping which will insist on the distinction "be-
tween, say, an international industrial cartel lowering temporarily 
its prices in a particular country long enough to liquidate sprout-
ing competitors and a poor country ... " which tries to break into 
difficult markets. 110 If the Secretary refuses to define fair value 
in a way to permit some differentiation along these lines, then 
giving the President power to prevent the frustration of American 
foreign policy by preventing the raising of trade barriers in cases 
108 GATT, ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES 164. 
109 MYRDAL, AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 257 (1956) • 
110 Id. at 258. 
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where the developing country is trying honestly to compete seems 
advisable.111 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the introduction to this article the act is described as having 
been intended to establish a policy of neutrality as between do-
mestic producers and their import competition. The administra-
tive interpretations since passage in 1921 illustrate the difficulties 
involved in maintaining such a policy. It would seem that these 
interpretations have swung the balance in favor of domestic com-
plainants. The courts have been reluctant to exercise significant 
control over the Treasury or Tariff Commission, even where deci-
sions have seemed questionable. As a result, there has been a good 
deal of agitation for legislative amendments. But while there have 
been numerous congressional hearings during the past ten years, 
the resulting amendments have been peripheral to the governing 
concepts of the act. Thus it would seem that remedial legislation 
or regulations would be desirable. 
The above discussion is concerned with suggestions for modifi-
cations in the administration of the act which would help to 
achieve the desired neutrality. The principal modification would 
be a reformulation of the concept of "fair value" to correspond 
with the competitive-price theory. This would allow competitive 
trade and discourage harassing complaints by domestic producers. 
Also important, to prevent the soil-pipe decision from becoming 
a precedent for future decisions, would be broad definitions of the 
"industry" injured by import competition and of the requisite 
degree of "injury" necessary to warrant protection for such an 
industry. The procedural protection of the AP A and the presump-
tion favorable to continued trade rather than of dumping would be 
further steps toward the neutrality envisaged by the framers of 
the act. And the extension of presidential review to findings would 
be some assurance that the interests of neither importers nor do-
mestic manufacturers will be given undue consideration. 
If this discussion has a central thesis, it is that the importer is 
entitled to an even chance to compete with the domestic producer. 
111 "A reduction of our trade barriers ••• can be of greater benefit to other countries 
than all the much-advertised grants, loans and technical aid." Statement of Professor 
Jacob Viner, quoted in MYRDAL, op. cit. supra note 109, at 290. 
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This position is supported by elemental notions of fairness, as well 
as by a desire to preserve normal channels of trade and the good 
will of other trading nations, especially at a time when many of 
these nations are forming trading blocs with potentially high ex-
ternal tariffs and import controls. There is no accurate means of 
gauging the amount of potential dumping discouraged by the ex-
istence of the act, but the widespread acceptance of its basic mech-
anism by most trading nations indicates that it is probably effec-
tive. By incorporation of the suggested modifications, the act 
could retain its effectiveness, while at the same time protecting 
the importer. 
